South Africa risk report
South Africa combines an unusually strong anti-corruption legal and institutional framework with persistently weak enforcement against the powerful. The country performs better than most of its sub-Saharan African peers on procedural and commercial measures, yet it remains defined by the legacy of state capture: the systematic looting of public institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) documented by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (the Zondo Commission), which found that capture occurred between 2009 and 2018 under former President Jacob Zuma and implicated roughly 1,438 individuals and entities. Corruption risk is highest in public procurement, SOEs, the police, and the extractive sector.
Two data points capture the present moment. South Africa scored 41 out of 100 on Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) , unchanged for a third consecutive year, below the global average of 42, and at the lowest level recorded since the index's modern methodology began. Yet in the same period the country was removed from the FATF grey list (October 2025) after a sustained anti-money-laundering reform programme. The gap between visible institutional reform and still-stalled high-level prosecutions is the central feature of South Africa's corruption-risk profile.
Companies should note that the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA) criminalises active and passive bribery in both the public and private sectors, the bribery of foreign public officials, and, following 2024 amendments, the failure of an organisation to prevent corruption. It is an offence to give any “gratification” not legally due, including facilitation payments.
OECD country risk classification
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4 of 7 (0 = lowest risk, 7 = highest; unchanged from previous review) South Africa holds a country risk classification of 4 of 7 on the scale maintained by the Participants to the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, valid as of the list dated 30 January 2026. This is a mid-range classification, well below the highest-risk category, and it was unchanged from the previous review. The measure is a debt-repayment and trade-finance risk indicator: it reflects transfer and convertibility risk and the risk of force majeure, and is used to set minimum premium rates for officially supported export credits. It is not a corruption score or a sovereign credit rating, and the OECD states it should not be repurposed as one. It is included here as a distinct, complementary data point for companies assessing trade and payment exposure. |
Corruption Perceptions Index: historical scores
|
Year |
CPI score (/100) |
Global rank |
|
2025 |
41 |
81 / 182 |
|
2024 |
41 |
82 / 180 |
|
2023 |
41 |
83 / 180 |
|
2022 |
43 |
72 / 180 |
|
2021 |
44 |
70 / 180 |
|
2020 |
44 |
69 / 180 |
|
2019 |
44 |
70 / 180 |
|
2012 (baseline) |
43 |
69 / 176 |
Score 0 = highly corrupt, 100 = very clean. South Africa peaked at 51 (2007) and has trended downward since 2014. (Transparency International, CPI 2025)
Judicial
system
Corruption in the judiciary is a moderate risk. South Africa's courts are widely regarded as independent and have repeatedly ruled against the country's most powerful figures, including sitting and former presidents. The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have a strong record of resisting executive pressure, and civil-society litigants regularly and successfully use the courts to enforce accountability. Direct bribery for favourable judicial outcomes is not generally reported as routine in commercial matters.
The principal risk is not bribery but delay and capacity strain. High-profile accused exploit procedural appeals to postpone trials for years (the so-called “Stalingrad” strategy), congested court rolls slow complex commercial litigation, and the judiciary remains under-resourced relative to its caseload. Questions about the integrity of judicial appointments have also surfaced, notably around the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Alternative dispute resolution is increasingly used to avoid the delays of formal litigation.
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CASE State v Jacob Zuma & Thales: arms-deal corruption trial Status: Ongoing / unresolved (hearings expected H2 2026) Former President Zuma and French defence firm Thales face fraud, corruption, money-laundering and racketeering charges arising from the 1990s strategic arms procurement, in which Zuma, then deputy president, is alleged to have received a corrupt retainer via financial adviser Schabir Shaik. In 2025 the KwaZulu-Natal High Court (Judge Chili) dismissed bids by both Zuma and Thales to halt the prosecution. Substantive hearings are expected only in the second half of 2026, nearly two decades after charges were first laid, illustrating how procedural delay, rather than judicial bias, is the dominant rule-of-law risk. |
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CASE Hlophe / Judicial Service Commission challenge Status: Concluded: court ruling (2025) In 2025 a court set aside the designation of John Hlophe, the first judge in South African history to be impeached (Judicial Conduct Tribunal finding, 2021, for attempting to influence Constitutional Court judges), to the Judicial Service Commission. The challenge was brought by Freedom Under Law, Corruption Watch and the Democratic Alliance, and the court found Parliament had failed to exercise proper discretion. The outcome demonstrates the judiciary's continued willingness to police its own integrity. |
Sources: Zuma/Thales (Daily Maverick / court reporting, 2025); CFR, judicial independence; US State Dept ICS
Police
Corruption in the South African Police Service (SAPS) is a very high risk. Beyond longstanding petty corruption (bribery at roadblocks and traffic stops is among the most commonly reported bribe-soliciting events), the police are now at the centre of allegations of organised criminal infiltration reaching the most senior levels of the state. South Africa also has one of the world's highest violent-crime rates, and the security costs of operating in the country are significant.
The defining development is the Madlanga Commission, a judicial commission of inquiry established by President Ramaphosa in July 2025 into criminality, political interference and corruption in the criminal-justice system. Because the allegations are untested and the inquiry is active, the matters below should be treated strictly as allegations at the testimony stage, not findings. Sources: Presidency, Madlanga establishment; Corruption Watch; Africa Report
Public
services
Corruption and inefficient bureaucracy are very high risks in public-service delivery. Irregular payments, nepotism and patronage (“cadre deployment,” the placement of party loyalists in public posts) are widely reported, and service-delivery failures at the municipal level are the most visible everyday cost of corruption. While regulatory, accounting and legal systems are broadly transparent and consistent with international norms, the capacity of public institutions has been hollowed out by the state-capture era.
State-owned enterprises remain the highest-exposure interface for business. The Gupta family, closely tied to former President Zuma, exercised influence so extensive that the Zondo Commission found it had effectively captured key SOEs and undermined institutions including the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the National Prosecuting Authority. Recovery of looted assets has progressed (roughly R11 billion recovered by March 2025), but successful prosecutions of senior figures remain rare.
Land
administration
There is a moderate risk of corruption in land administration. Property registration is comparatively efficient by regional standards, and property rights are protected in practice from arbitrary expropriation, though they are subject to ongoing land-reform and restitution policy. The Expropriation Act, 2024, which provides for expropriation in the public interest and, in defined circumstances, for nil compensation, has heightened investor attention to the legal framework around property; companies should monitor implementation and the litigation that is expected to test it.
Corruption risk in this sector is concentrated in traditional-authority and municipal land allocation, where opaque processes and disputed claims create openings for bribery and patronage. High-value land and infrastructure deals linked to politically connected intermediaries have featured in several provincial scandals.
Sources: US State Dept ICS, property rights; Government of SA, Expropriation Act 2024
Tax
administration
Corruption in tax administration presents a moderate risk. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is widely regarded as one of the better-functioning state institutions, and bribes are not commonly reported as a condition of paying tax. SARS operates a fraud and anti-corruption hotline and has rebuilt capacity after the state-capture era, during which it was a documented target.
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CASE Capture and rebuilding of SARS Status: Concluded inquiry (Nugent); institutional rebuild ongoing The Nugent Commission found that SARS was deliberately weakened during the period when Tom Moyane was commissioner, with the dismantling of enforcement and investigative units (the so-called “rogue unit” narrative) used to neutralise the agency. Under Commissioner Edward Kieswetter, SARS has since rebuilt enforcement capability and played a central role in the reforms that secured South Africa's exit from the FATF grey list, including a new traveller cash-declaration system and beneficial-ownership data sharing. |
Sources: SARS, FATF grey-list exit; Presidency, Nugent/SARS reforms
Customs
administration
Corruption when importing and exporting poses a high risk. Irregular payments and bribery at ports and border posts do occur, and companies report dissatisfaction with the time-predictability of customs procedures. Cross-border smuggling, under-invoicing and illicit financial flows are significant, and customs touchpoints were among the channels exploited during the state-capture period.
Border-management reform is underway through the Border Management Authority, and SARS customs has tightened controls on cash and bearer instruments as part of the post-grey-list AML programme. Despite this, corruption risk at the physical border and in clearing-agent relationships remains elevated.
Sources: SARS, traveller/cash declaration reforms; US State Dept ICS
Public
procurement
Public procurement is a very high risk and the single most important corruption vector for businesses dealing with the South African state. Favouritism in contract awards and the diversion of public funds are widely perceived, and procurement fraud is common. Procurement through large SOEs (“parastatals”) was the principal mechanism of state capture, channelling tens of billions of rand to politically connected intermediaries.
The framework has been substantially reformed. The Public Procurement Act, 2024 consolidates a previously fragmented system into a single regulatory regime intended to improve transparency and oversight. Preferential-procurement and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) policies pursue redress objectives but have also been criticised as vectors for elite enrichment and “fronting,” and can disadvantage foreign suppliers. Companies are strongly advised to conduct enhanced due diligence on counterparties, beneficial owners and intermediaries in any state-linked contract.
Natural
resources
Mining and energy operations are highly vulnerable to corruption. The scale of the sector, the value of concessions and the volume of interactions with officials (over licensing, permits and customs) create substantial bribery exposure. Illegal mining (“zama zamas”) and associated money laundering are widespread, and the mining regulator has been criticised for politicisation and capacity gaps in the licensing process.
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CASE Eskom, coal and the Optimum Coal Mine Status: Investigations & asset recovery; senior prosecutions stalled The Zondo Commission detailed how Gupta-linked interests acquired Optimum Coal Mine after pressure on Glencore, and how Eskom coal and consulting contracts were steered to connected parties. A former Eskom chief executive alleged that around R1 billion a month was being stolen from the utility. Asset-recovery settlements (including with ABB, McKinsey, SAP and Optimum) have returned significant sums, but criminal accountability for the most senior individuals remains largely unresolved. |
Sources: TI, CPI 2024 (Eskom theft estimate); Zondo Commission overview
Legislation
South Africa has a well-developed anti-corruption legal framework; the enduring problem is enforcement against powerful actors rather than gaps in the law. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA), 2004 criminalises corruption in the public and private sectors, including attempted corruption, extortion, active and passive bribery, the bribery of foreign public officials, abuse of office and money laundering, and obliges public officials to report corrupt activity. Providing any “gratification” not legally due, including gifts and facilitation payments, is an offence.
The framework was strengthened after the Zondo Commission. The Judicial Matters Amendment Act (2023) added a new PRECCA offence (section 34A) for the failure of public or private organisations to prevent corruption , broadly comparable to the UK Bribery Act's corporate offence, which took effect in April 2024 and materially raises corporate compliance obligations. The NPA Amendment Act (2024) created a permanent Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC) with police powers, operational from August 2024. The Public Procurement Act (2024) overhauls tender regulation. Whistleblower protections exist but are widely regarded as inadequate, and consolidated reform remains pending.
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AML / FATF grey-list exit (October 2025) South Africa was grey-listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2023 as a direct consequence of state-capture-era weaknesses, with 22 action items across eight strategic deficiencies. After a comprehensive reform programme (beneficial-ownership registries, stronger FIC and SARS enforcement, and demonstrable increases in money-laundering investigations), and a July 2025 on-site assessment, the FATF removed South Africa from the grey list on 24 October 2025, 32 months after listing. This is the clearest example of delivered institutional reform. A follow-up FATF evaluation is expected in 2026–27, so sustained enforcement will be tested. |
South Africa has ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The OECD Working Group on Bribery has repeatedly criticised South Africa's low level of foreign-bribery enforcement.
Sources: National Treasury, FATF exit; Presidency, legislative reforms; UNODC, UNCAC
Civil
society
South Africa has one of Africa's strongest environments for civil society and independent media, and these institutions are central to its anti-corruption resilience. Freedom of expression is constitutionally protected and broadly respected in practice. The country ranks 27th of 180 on RSF’s 2025 World Press Freedom Index , the highest in Africa alongside Namibia, and up from 38th in 2024, with RSF attributing the strength to robust civil society and institutions.
Investigative journalism and NGOs (including Corruption Watch, the TI national chapter, OUTA and amaBhungane) have driven much of the exposure of state capture. Risks flagged by monitors include concentration of media ownership, dependence on state and corporate advertising, political smear campaigns against journalists, and threats to those reporting on corruption. Freedom House notes that the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act (March 2025) added a judicial-approval requirement for bulk interception but drew civil-society concern over vague definitions.
Sources: RSF, WPFI 2025 (Africa); Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2025
Sources
This profile is compiled exclusively from institutional and primary sources (international indices and conventions, South African government and statutory bodies, multilateral organizations, and recognized civil-society monitors), supplemented by court and commission records for case specifics. Index scores, rankings and the status of legal proceedings were verified against the most recent available releases as at June 2026. Named matters that are active or unadjudicated are flagged as such; content naming sitting officials and ongoing proceedings (Police and Public Services sections) is flagged for GAN legal review prior to publication.
Consolidated source list
1. Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 2025, South Africa.
2. Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, South Africa.
3. Transparency International: CPI 2025: Sub-Saharan Africa regional analysis.
4. Corruption Watch (TI South Africa): CPI 2025: SA's performance unchanged.
5. The Presidency, Republic of South Africa: Progress report on implementation of the State Capture Commission recommendations (July 2025).
6. Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture: Zondo Commission Report (overview).
7. National Prosecuting Authority (NPA): Joint NPA/DPCI statement on the Zondo Commission Report.
8. Corruption Watch: State capture update: progress on government response to Zondo recommendations.
9. The Presidency, Republic of South Africa: Statement on establishment of the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry.
10. Corruption Watch: The Madlanga Commission's first week.
11. US Department of Justice / reporting: McKinsey Africa USD 123m FCPA settlement (Transnet/Eskom).
12. Financial Action Task Force (FATF): Jurisdictions under increased monitoring, October 2025 plenary.
13. National Treasury, Republic of South Africa: South Africa exits the FATF grey list (24 October 2025).
14. Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC): South Africa exits the grey list (media release).
15. South African Revenue Service (SARS): Media release: South Africa's exit from the FATF grey list.
16. Reporters Without Borders (RSF): World Press Freedom Index 2025: Africa.
17. Freedom House: South Africa: Freedom on the Net 2025.
18. US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement, South Africa.
19. Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI): Zondo Recommendations Tracker, 2025 update.
20. Government of South Africa: Public Procurement Act, 2024 (Act No. 28 of 2024).
21. Government of South Africa: Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA), 2004.
22. UNODC: United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).
23. OECD: South Africa: OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.